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DEFENSE PROBLEMS
UNDER THE DURHAM RULE
HUGH J. MCGEE*
W HAT WOULD BE THE REACTION of the bar, the bench, the press
and the community as a whole if the following legislation were
recommended to the Congress of the United States?'
No psychopath, alcoholic, sexual deviate, or psychoneurotic person shall
be convicted of any crime committed in the District of Columbia unless the
Government shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's
criminal act was not the product of said condition.
Certainly a furor would be created by the mere attempt to enact
such legislation, even if it were to be subsequently modified to provide
for treatment of the persons so acquitted.
Congress does not, and would not, contemplate such a change in
the law which, in effect, would amend every criminal provision of the
D.C. Code, and all criminal provisions of the United States Code
applicable to the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, it is substantially
the law in the District of Columbia today, as the result of the now
famous Durham decision2 and the fifty-odd cases handed down since
then attempting to explain or qualify its deceptively simple language.
The community's alarm or concern over this revolutionary change
in our system of criminal jurisprudence was temporarily quieted by the
passage of Public Law 3133 in the 84th Congress. This statute provides
for mandatory commitment of those found not guilty by reason of
insanity, and removes the judicial discretion which previously existed
to release a person who, though insane at the time of the offense, has
obviously recovered completely. Society and the United States Attorney's
office were thereby assured that any one who escaped conviction by
means of an insanity defense, legitimate or otherwise, would not escape
confinement in a mental institution.
4
* LL.B. (1947), Columbus School of Law of the Catholic University of America.
Former Assistant U.S. Attorney; former Chairman, D.C. Bar Association Com-
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1 Congress is the legislative body for the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST.
art. I, §8.
2 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
3 D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301(d) (Supp. 1958).
4 So that a criminal who successfully feigns mental illness in an attempt to "bug
out" will receive his punishment in a mental institution rather than in a jail.
In criminal cases involving mental com-
petency the problems of defense counsel
will differ greatly, but I am certain that
no jurisdiction will surpass the District of
Columbia in the number or complexity of
such problems. To say that the law has
been fluid5 since Durham would be a
tragic understatement. The rule or test set
forth in Durham has been the subject of
tremendous controversy in legal and psy-
chiatric circles. 6 It has been hailed as the
5 The principal criticism of the cases following
Durham is that each has been decided on an ad
hoc basis, and that in many instances the appel-
late court has substituted its determination of the
facts for that of the trial court. The following is
from Judge Wilbur K. Miller's excellent dissent in
Knight v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 14 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), where eleven psychiatrists testified
at the trial: "Apparently the majority view is
that the testimony of five psychiatrists who
thought Wright was insane when he killed his
wife so overwhelmed the contrary testimony of
the lay witnesses that the jurors were unreason-
able in not accepting their opinion." Id. at 15.
"About all the medical testimony in its entirety
proved to a certainty is that psychiatry is not an
exact science." Ibid. "The action of the court in
this case disturbs me for another reason to which
I have already made reference: it is an exercise
of appellate review of a jury's factual finding
reached on conflicting evidence but supported by
substantial proof. Traditionally such a finding
cannot be disturbed on appeal. I suggest that
stable rules of law and consistent application of
them are essential for the guidance of bench and
bar in trial practice and procedures. Instability
and inconsistency result when an appellate court
retries each case on a new and different standard
and substitutes its own determination for that of
the jury concerning a defendant's mental status
and its causative effect." Id. at 18. "For these
reasons I think the majority opinion further com-
plicates a complex and difficult problem, and...
will add to the confusion already engendered by
the Durham rule, as given ad hoc interpretations
in subsequent opinions of this court. It is made
more vague by what the majority say here. I am
sure the District Court judges, who have hereto-
fore found it difficult to understand and apply
the rule, will now find it more difficult." Id. at 19.
6 The court acknowledged in its opinion that it
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emancipation of the psychiatrist as a wit-
ness and as the recognition of psychiatry
as a science - but whatever its appraisal
in academic circles, it has been the cause
of nothing but confusion in the courts of
the District of Columbia.
The frequency of the explanatory and
qualifying opinions is increasing as time
goes on, and because of the completely
unique concept (i.e., of treating rather than
punishing) underlying the Durham rule, it
is likely that they will continue to increase.
These decisions and the passage of Public
Law 313, which has been expanded and
interpreted in the Leach,7 Starr,8 and Rosen-
field9 cases, make it incorrect to refer to
Durham as the law in the District of Colum-
bia. A more accurate means of expressing
the law would be "Durham, et seq."
The problems of defense counsel begin
was exercising a legislative or "judicial function
or revising and enlarging the common law" in
the absence of an expression by Congress. Dur-
ham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 n.44
(D.C. Cir. 1954). It is interesting to note here that
the State of Maryland has declined even to expand
the M'Naghten rule. Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565,
115 A.2d 502 (1955); Thomas v. State, 206 Md.
575, 112 A.2d 913 (1955).
7 Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.
1958). After a lengthy hearing at which seven
psychiatrists testified for almost six days, Judge
Schweinhaut of the district court ordered Leach's
release, but the circuit court reversed, saying:
"There must be freedom from such abnormal
mental condition as would make the individual
dangerous to himself or the community in the
reasonably foreseeable future." Id. at 670.
8 Starr v. United States, No. 13,865, D.C. Cir.,
October 17, 1958 (rehearing en banc). In a
dissenting opinion in which four of the nine judges
concur it is stated: "The majority concludes,
however, that leaving out the safety element of
the test was the logical thing to do, because, as
a matter of law, mere danger will not justify con-
finement if the defendant has 'recovered his san-
ity .' "
9 In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957).
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immediately upon being appointed or re-
tained, principally because of rulings by
the circuit court to the effect that. a
mental examination must be granted, when
requested, provided only that the motion
be not frivolous and made in good faith.'0
The decision as to whether to request
a mental examination must be weighed with
the greatest care because of the serious
consequences" of a successful plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity. Then, too,
the expanded concept of mental disease,
which now encompasses all of the so-called
"personality disorders, 1 2 makes it quite
simple to obtain psychiatric testimony to
the effect that your client is suffering from
a mental disease. Prior to the Leach case
insanity was closely related to psychosis, 13
and the presence of a psychosis was not
difficult for even a lawyer to recognize.
The opinion in the Durham case and sev-
10 Wear v. United States, 218 F.2d 24 (D.D.C.
1954). "When the claim of insanity is not frivo-
lous, to allow the court to determine that there is
no cause to believe that an accused may be in-
sane or otherwise mentally incompetent would
be inconsistent with the legislative purpose to
provide for the detection of mental disorders
,not . . . readily apparent to the eye of the lay-
man.' . . . We therefore hold that a motion on
behalf of an accused for a mental examination
made in good faith and not frivolous, must be
granted under the statute." Id. at 26-27.
"t Under Public Law 313 as presently interpreted
it could easily result in life imprisonment in the
maximum security ward of St. Elizabeth's Hospi-
tal.
12 For a complete definition of terms see AMERI-
CAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(1952).
1a This appears to be the case in England where
the British Royal Commission found insanity
regarded medically to mean that "the patient is
suffering from a major mental disease (usually
a psychosis)." Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, 1949-53, REPORT Cmd. No. 8932
(1953).
eral of the subsequent decisions in this
field have clearly indicated 14 that person-
ality disorders will be considered as men-
tal diseases for the purposes of determin-
ing criminal responsibility. Although the
psychiatrists were in substantial accord
immediately following Durham that the
so-called personality disorders would not
be considered mental diseases, 15 they
are now prepared to testify that a person
suffering from any of the listed disorders
is suffering from a mental disease.'0 A brief
perusal of the psychiatric nomenclature re-
ferred to above is essential before one can
realize the all-inclusiveness of these cate-
gories. On careful consideration, it can be
seen that almost anyone, if not everyone,
could be placed in one of these groupings.
Upon the introduction of some evidence of
any one of these so-called mental diseases
it then becomes the burden of the govern-
ment to disprove causal connection' 7 be-
tween the disease and the offense.
The initial decision whether to plead
insanity must depend to a large extent
upon the probable sentence if convicted. In
capital cases the penalty and nature of the
14 See, e.g., Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640
(D.C. Cir. 1957); Lyles v. United States, 254
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
961 (1958).
15 See Insanity and the Criminal Law - A Cri-
tique of Durham v. United States, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317 (1955). See also testimony before the
American Law Institute and testimony before
the District of Columbia Law Enforcement Coun-
cil, Subcommittee on Insanity as a Criminal
Defense.
16 Leach v. Overholser, Habeas Corpus No. 33-58
(the district court proceedings which ordered
Leach's release).
17 See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 614
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Douglas v. United States, 239
F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Wright v. United
States, 215 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
offense' s require19 a motion for mental ex-
amination; however, in all misdemeanors
and the lesser felonies where the punish-
ment might range from probation to ten
years, it is extremely difficult to decide
whether "not guilty by reason of insanity"
would be a wise plea. The standard or
standards for release, under Public Law
313 as amended by judicial interpretation,
are so completely vague and indefinite that
no lawyer could evaluate the possible sen-
tence against indefinite incarceration in the
maximum security ward of a mental insti-
tution. The question of obtaining treatment
for a bona fide mental illness becomes rela-
tively unimportant, as treatment is theo-
retically available in all federal penal
institutions and, upon expiration of the
defendant's sentence, a much more affirma-
tive finding20 is required for continued
confinement and treatment.
The prerequisite certification of "free-
dom from such abnormal21 mental condi-
tion as would make [him] dangerous to
himself or the community in the reason-
ably foreseeable future" 22 puts a defendant
in such an indefinite status as to release
18 Many psychiatrists feel that any person who
kills another must be, ipso facto, mentally ill.
19 This is the writer's opinion.
20 18 U.S.C. §§4241-47 (1952). The last section
provides, in substance, that a prisoner may be
held even after the expiration of his sentence if
he ". . . is insane or mentally incompetent, and
that if released he will probably endanger the
safety of the officers, the property, or other in-
terests of the United States, and that suitable
arrangements for the custody and care of the
prisoner are not otherwise available ....
21 The doctors at St. Elizabeth's Hospital are in
substantial accord that this certification could
only be made for an infinitesimally small per-
centage of persons who have committed a crime.
22 Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
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that no conscientious lawyer should attempt
the defense of insanity unless confronted
with life imprisonment or capital punish-
ment. Here then we see that at the very
beginning of a criminal case counsel faces
severe criticism for not preparing to inter-
pose, to an alleged crime which could have
a maximum of one year in jail, a defense
which might result in his client's confine-
ment in a mental institution for life. The
strong possibility that any of the neuroses
or personality disorders could result in in-
definite hospitalization is borne out by the
uniform psychiatric testimony to the effect
that these illnesses are seldom, 23 if ever,
cured.24
The Durham decision itself was hailed
for its liberal approach toward the progress
of psychiatry and the inhumanity of con-
fining a sick person to a penal institution.
However, the present status of the law
makes a plea of insanity far from humane.
Most persons classified as personality dis-
orders or neurotics are rational and, there-
fore, will personally choose the lesser of the
two alternative punishments. It is safe to
say that, with the standards for release as
they presently exist, a person would have
to be absolutely insane to plead insanity
when charged with a minor criminal of-
fense. From the point of duration of pos-
sible incarceration the person charged with
the misdemeanor would be wiser to enter
a plea of guilty even if he has a legitimate
23The only suggested treatment for these ill-
nesses is psychotherapy, which is a lengthy treat-
ment, not readily available, and depends to a large
extent upon the patient's complete cooperation.
24 Dr. Duvall in the original Leach case testified
that when a recovery occurs in a sociopath
(formerly known as a psychopathic personality),
you must wonder whether the original diagnosis
was correct. This aspect of psychiatric testimony
is almost indefensible.
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defense of insanity.
An equally serious consideration is the
quality of confinement. Although St. Eliza-
beth's Hospital is regarded highly for its
professional and physical facilities, to be.
confined 24 hours a day with seriously ill
mental patients can do more harm than
good. Conceivably, a mildly ill "inadequate
personality" could spend several years in
a maximum security ward with convicted
homicidal maniacs upon acquittal by rea-
son of insanity for petit larceny or a traffic
violation.
Although the decisions setting the stand-
ards for release are fairly recent, many pa-
tients and prisoners awaiting trial are fully
aware that they would probably serve less
time under more pleasant conditions if they
were to be convicted than if they were suc-
cessful in a plea of insanity. I was recently
asked by a patient at the hospital, who had
charges pending against him, to "unbug"
him. He meant by this that his personal
analysis of the amended Leach case had
caused him to regret his initial decision to
"bug out." I doubt if this man will ever
again permit counsel to offer a defense
of insanity in his behalf, but whoever repre-
sents him will unquestionably be criticized
for not presenting the defense because of
the man's history of mental difficulty. This
man also stated that he couldn't stand the
company any longer and that he would
much rather be in jail. This was not the
first time I have heard this sentiment ex-
pressed; in fact, one client of mine who had
served time in many penal institutions all
over the country said that he would prefer
any one of the jails he had been in to
Howard Hall.2 5 Although there seems to
25 The maximum security ward of St. Elizabeth's
Hospital.
be little complaint about the food or f~cil-
ities, it is a general complaint that the
constant fear of attack by patients is almost
unbearable. Second only to the fear is the
weird and almost unbelievable conduct of
the fellow inmates. An unannounced visit
to a disturbed ward of a mental hospital
will probably suffice to confirm these coni-
plaints to a large extent. Such a visit will
do much to dispel anyone's feeling that
hospitalization is intrinsically humane and
unquestionably of benefit to the recipient.
For many of these patients the doctors
readily admit that there is no known cure
or successful treatment, so that their only
treatment consists of "observation in a
controlled environment. ' 26 This situation,
plus the complaints and the zombies which
line the walls on some of the less-disturbed
wards, has convinced me that there is much
more than just "time" to be considered in
pleading a man not guilty by reason of
insanity.
While I am personally convinced that
the present standards for release following
a commitment pursuant to Public Law
313 are so vague and indefinite as to be
unconstitutional, I have grave doubts as
to whether the conditions of confinement
of these persons does not likewise consti-
tute cruel and inhuman punishment.
One case typical of the myriad of latent
problems in the law as it now stands re-
mained undecided as recently as Decem-
ber 23, 1958.27 In the case of Edith Louise
Hough, a patient committed under Public
Law 313, the Superintendent of St. Eliza-
beth's Hospital certified to the court that
26 Which is the psychiatric nomenclature for con-
finement.
27 United States v. Hough, District Court (un-
reported).
the patient's condition was such that she
was entitled to conditional release. The
United States Attorney, who usually repre-
sents the hospital, presented psychiatric
testimony to the effect that she was still
dangerous, and the court, after a hearing,
denied counsel's request for her conditional
release. During the hearing testimony
brought out that the patient had been leav-
ing the hospital grounds regularly without
an attendant. The court subsequently ruled
that this constituted a conditional release
without the statutory judicial sanction. The
superintendent of the hospital has stated
that these unattended visits were, part of a
rehabilitation program for the patient and
had a definite therapeutic effect. The circuit
court held that these persons are in a dif-
ferent category from the regularly com-
mitted patients, and the statute and its
legislative history clearly bear this out.
What is this category then? Is there a con-
notation of punishment, even though the
patient has been "acquitted" and has "no
blame"?
Herein lies one of the basic difficulties
which is inherent in the law as it stands
today. The proponents of Durham would
place almost unlimited responsibility and
discretion upon the psychiatrists 2 as to the
disposition and treatment of criminals in
the belief that this is the humane and sym-
pathetic thing to do, whereas Public Law
313 was passed to guarantee confinement
of these persons, to limit the psychiatric
discretion as to release, and to limit the
use of the defense of insanity.
Until the law becomes crystallized and
some reasonable basis exists upon which
a prognosis can be made for release, all
28 See Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
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decisions to plead insanity must be cau-
tiously weighed. The need for crystalliza-
tion or clarification of the law on this sub-
ject is urgent.
There can be no crystallization of the
law under Durham because changes in
psychiatric thinking and testimony can
amend the law at any time. 29 In the Leach
case what was then thought to be the law
was amended at a meeting of the psychia-
trists at St. Elizabeth's Hospital on the
third day of a six-day criminal trial. A con-
ference of hospital psychiatrists had previ-
ously found Leach to be "competent to
stand trial" and "of sound mind." When
the defense of insanity at the time of the
commission of the offense was raised dur-
ing the criminal trial the two psychiatrists
from St. Elizabeth's Hospital testified that
although he was suffering from a socio-
pathic personality disturbance, he was
"sane, not mentally ill, not mentally sick,"
and that he was "not suffering from any
mental disease or disorder." The follow-
ing day after expert testimony was pre-
sented by the defendant to the effect that a
"sociopath" does suffer from a mental dis-
ease and that Leach was "mentally ill," the
government presented Dr. Addison B.
Duvall, Acting Superintendent of St. Eliza-
beth's Hospital, who testified that at a
conference of officials at St. Elizabeth's
Hospital that morning they (the psychia-
trists) had decided that they would no
longer classify sociopaths as being "with-
out mental disorder"30 and that the doc-
tors from St. Elizabeth's Hospital who testi-
fied in criminal cases henceforward would
29 See United States v. Leach, Cr. No. 450-57,
in which Leach was found not guilty by reason of
insanity by a jury.
30 This had been the administrative procedure
for many years.
DEFENSE PROBLEMS
testify that persons diagnosed as sociopaths
would be considered as suffering from a
"mental disease."'3 1
In Leach's habeas corpus proceeding to
obtain his release from St. Elizabeth's Hos-
pital pursuant to the jury's finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity, five doctors
from St. Elizabeth's Hospital testified that
although Leach's mental condition had not
changed in any respect,32 he was now
suffering from a mental disease, a mental
disorder, and two even stated that he was of
"unsound mind." These doctors explained
their change in opinion as being caused by
their independent reading and research
on the subject, and their belated recogni-
tion of advanced psychiatric thinking.
Since the change in policy by St. Eliza-
beth's Hospital in the Leach case, the
United States Attorney's Office is having as
many defendants as possible examined at
District General Hospital 33 where the atti-
tude of the psychiatrists has been more
conservative with regard to testimony on
presence of mental disease.
This difference of opinion among gov-
ernment institutional psychiatrists is noth-
ing compared to the range of opinion to be
found among private psychiatrists. Either
extreme may, of course, be retained to ex-
amine the client during or without an
examination by government psychiatrists.
Much care must be taken in the selection
of a psychiatrist, and in this connection a
lot will depend upon the attorney's famil-
31 See Cavanagh, The Responsibility of the Men-
tally Ill for Criminal Offenses, 4 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 317, 332 (Autumn 1958).
32 Most of them had not even seen him since
the original trial.
33 A municipal hospital. St. Elizabeth's is a fed-
eral institution which takes care of District of
Columbia patients because of limited municipal
facilities.
iarity with the professional thinking of the
different psychiatrists available, and also
upon the funds available for the defense of
the case. Independent psychiatric testimony
can be very expensive, especially when
lengthy examination and trial is necessary. 34
A seasoned prosecutor can give a
psychiatric witness the same going over
that a defense attorney might be able to give
the government's witness, so that it is desir-
able to have a doctor with as much court-
room experience as possible.3 5
In the actual trial of the case the same
problems exist as in other jurisdictions ex-
cept that they are aggravated here by the
vastness of the concept of "mental disease,"
and the uncertainty of the law upon re-
view by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. 36 The
general tenor of these decisions has been
to favor the defendant who is seeking treat-
ment, even to the extent of finding preju-
dicial error in counsel's failure to argue
insanity to the jury when there was so
little evidence of insanity that to argue the
point might have insulted the intelligence
or alienated the sympathies of the jury.37
All of these decisions raise incidental ques-
34 Although private psychiatrists can be obtained
in the indigent case by motion, the prosecution
has a definite advantage because of the doctors'
reluctance to leave their remunerative practices
for-lengthy court appearances at court-set fees.
35 Most government psychiatrists have that ex-
perience as the result of many court appearances
and frequent briefings on the law by prosecutors.
36 The lack of precedents in New Hampshire and
the District is further complicated by the differ-
ences in opinion which exist among the nine
judges of the Court. See, e.g., the per curiam pref-
ace to the separate opinions in Lyles v. United
States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
37 Clark v. United States, 259 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir.
1958). In a classic dissent Judge Burger said,
"The majority holds that counsel committed fatal
error in failing to argue the issue of insanity to
the jury and for conceding that a lesser degree of
tions38 which counsel must guess at wildly,
and to which the answer will depend upon
the division of the Court which might hear
the case.
In spite of the fact that this community
was nowhere near ready for such a radical
change as Durham, Public Law 313 as-
homicide occurred. Implicit in the holding is the
finding that this conduct constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. I dissent on the grounds
that it is wholly unwarranted for counsel to be
required by an appellate court to argue to a jury
an issue or point which, as a matter of deliberate
and calculated tactics, he considers it in his
client's interest to abandon. Celebrated criminal
defense advocates, as well as more modestly
endowed lawyers, have done this for centuries.
Indeed a defense lawyer who would try to make
out an insanity defense on the 'evidence' of
insanity in this record might well be charged with
incompetence for taking the risk of alienating the
jury's sympathies." Id. at 186.
38 Clatterbuck v. United States, Misc. 1006, in
which Judge Bazelon said, "The foregoing matters
raise disturbing questions: Was petitioner prop-
erly found competent to stand trial? See Bishop
v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 223 F.2d
582 (1955), reversed on other grounds, 350 U.S.
961 (1956). Was petitioner deprived of the effec-
tive assistance of counsel at crucial stages in these
proceedings? See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948). What is the effect of the court's refu-
sal at the second competency proceeding to pro-
vide, at Government expense, both a transcript
of the original competency proceeding and psy-
chiatrists to testify in his behalf? See Williams v.
United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 250 F.2d 19
(1957). Do the findings of fact made pursuant to
the limited hearing conducted upon this court's
remand constitute a bar to consideration of some
or all of these issues? Should the hearing on the
motion to vacate sentence have been confined in
scope to consideration of the allegations of the
movant, whose mental history suggests a prima
facie inability to be master of his own pleadings?
See Lebkicker v. United States, No. 13932 (per
curiam order dated March 24, 1958); Belton v.
United States, No. 13690, decided May 15, 1958;
Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266,
244 F.2d 355 (1957). If so, by what evidence ad-
duced at trial was petitioner's sanity at the time
of the offense proven 'beyond a reasonable doubt,'
as is required once some evidence of insanity has
been introduced?"
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sured society and the government that
individuals who had committed criminal
acts would get at least as much, and prob-
ably more, punishment upon an acquittal
by reason of insanity than they would upon
conviction. The Congress, in passing Pub-
lic Law 313, never contemplated that the
"personality disorders," would be consid-
ered as mental disease within the meaning
of Durham. Nor did they realize that the
concept of "mental disease" set forth in
Durham would be the only entrance re-
quirement to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for
many, possibly for life, at government ex-
pense. 9 No thought whatsoever was given
to the expense factor, because it was clearly
not considered that the admission and re-
lease requirements would be changed so
quickly.
So we see that Public Law 313,40 which
'as intended to OIrotect society from a small
percentage of offenders who might escape
conviction because of the vagueness and
uncertainty of Durham, has become the op-
pressive instrument for limiting legitimate
defenses of insanity because of the present
inescapable standards for release, which
postulate indefinite incarceration under
grim circumstances.
Although I have been fairly certain from
the beginning that Durham was bad law41
39 The District of Columbia Council on Law En-
forcement subcommittee failed to anticipate the
passive nature of the charge to the jury which
would be the basis for life imprisonment, with-
out any affirmative finding that the criminal act
was actually committed by the individual (or
whether justification existed), and they also failed
to anticipate the change in psychiatric thinking
with regard to the so-called "personality dis-
orders."
40An indispensable crutch for Durham. See con-
gressional history.
41 Principally because of the patent ambiguity
and certainty of jury confusion inherent therein.
DEFENSE PROBLEMS
I have tried not to reject it without a fair
trial and full consideration because of my
tremendous respect for the majority of
Durham's proponents. 42 The Durham rule
has now had four and one-half years to
prove itself workable, and has brought
only chaotic uncertainty to lawyers, judges
and jurors.
The prevalence of semantic problems in
this field is further complicated by the in-
sertion by the Durham rule of the concept
of "causality," which insidiously vests in
the psychiatrist the ultimate decision as to
responsibility.
And this is done, despite the protesta-
tions to the contrary, 43 by permitting or
requiring the expert to answer the questions
of whether the act was the product of the
disease. 44
It is here, in the psychiatrist's determi-
nation of "what degree" of casual connec-
tion is necessary for exculpation that he
See Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
42 An alert, intelligent, liberal and, in many in-
stances, very sincere group of active and effective
people whose fight for the rights of the individual
(in other fields of law) almost amounts to dedi-
cation.
43 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
44 Under the decisions the government has the
burden of disproving mental disease and causal
connection. This cannot be done without expert
testimony, and this is not obtainable because the
psychiatrists readily explain that they have no
competency to testify on "causality" or "produc-
tivity" as they are concepts similar to "right and
wrong" and have no medical meaning. Nor do
all psychiatrists agree with "treatment rather
than punishment." The fiscal and physical facil-
ities are totally inadequate to handle our enor-
mous penal population in hospitals, and the
profession of psychiatry is neither ready, willing
nor able to cope with the problems which would
be thrust upon them. We would need at least ten
times the number of psychiatrists we now have to
maintain the institutions alone.
must call on his own personal philosophy
and make his own moral judgment on the
question of criminal responsibility.
By the answer to this question, his moral
judgment is submitted to the jury in the
guise of expert testimony.
By laughing away M'Naghten and Smith45
as antiquated, obsolete and unrealistic, the
proponents of Durham have been able to
persuade its critics into searching for a defi-
nition of insanity or a new rule which is
better than Durham. This has been a tre-
mendous piece of strategy because it has
set the excellent minds of those who feel
and "know" that Durham is "wrong" to
the almost impossible task of finding a
workable substitute for M'Naghten and
Smith, which are time tested and based on
solid philosophical concepts.
Congressman John Dowdy of Texas sub-
mitted a bill in the 85th Congress which
contained the following provision:
In any criminal prosecution in a court
of competent jurisdiction in the District of
Columbia where the insanity of the defen-
dant is raised as a defense, the test for
determining the defendant's criminal re-
sponsibility shall be the common law test
as such common law test was in effect in
the District of Columbia on June 30, 1954.46
It is certain that the proponents of treat-
ment rather than punishment will criticize
or condemn the above section of Congress-
man Dowdy's bill as reactionary and regres-
sive, but it would at least put an end to
(Continued on page 86)
45 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir.
1929) had supplemented the M'Naghten rule with
the "irresistible impulse" test in the District of
Columbia before Durham.
4 6 H.R. 13774, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. §2 (1958).
It is understood that this section will be submitted
to the present Congress as a separate bill.
